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CRUSADING FOR THE HELPLESS OR BITING THE
HAND THAT FEEDS? APPLYING LANDLORD-
TENANT LAW TO RESIDENTS IN SHELTERS
Matthew R Hays*
INTRODUCTION
When a victim of domestic violence flees her abuser, she often
has little choice but to turn to a shelter for refuge.' Such sanctuaries
help distressed women by providing vital services that include counsel-
ing meetings, awareness programs, and living arrangements. 2 Despite
the importance of the relationship between battered women and
homeless shelters, however, the legal status of such relationships
remains unclear. The shelter is certainly not a traditional landlord in
the sense that it makes residents sign a lease and then hands over the
keys without any further association. The victim is not the traditional
tenant in that she needs far more than just a room-she needs the
services and the community to help her escape the cycle of violence.
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2008; B.S. Management
with concentrations in Economics and Finance, Boston College, 2005. To Mom, Dad,
and Mike for their continued support through school. Thanks to Margaret Ryznar for
her helpful edits on this Note; Peter R. Silverman of Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick
LLP for the topic idea and subsequent assistance; and the editors of the Notre Dame
Law Review for all of their hard work.
1 These services help battered women rebuild their lives. See Gretchen P. Mul-
lins, The Battered Woman and Homelessness, 3J.L. & POL'Y 237, 250 (1994) ("The need
for emergency housing and support services for battered women often remains the
only real protection that society has to offer.").
2 In surveys, shelters are viewed as the most effective formal help service for bat-
tered women. See Merle H. Weiner, From Dollars to Sense: A Critique of Government Fund-
ing for the Battered Women's Shelter Movement, 9 LAw & INEQ. 185, 188 n.13 (1991)
(comparing the perceived effectiveness of shelters with physicians, clergymen, district
attorneys, police, lawyers, and social services agencies). One possible reason for the
success of shelters is that they allow women to be completely removed from their
abusive environments, helping them to slowly but certainly rebuild their lives without
any negative influences. Id. at 192. Once they have separated from their abuser,
women are free to focus on themselves and pursue their own goals. Id.
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The shelter is not a hotel in the traditional sense either, and the vic-
tim is not a guest.
The nature of the relationship between the shelter and its
residents is generally governed by state statutory law. However, rarely
does a state statute address shelters directly. Instead, state courts must
decide whether and how to apply landlord-tenant statutes to the shel-
ter context. While some courts find that shelters are landlords, others
do not. Furthermore, when disputes inevitably arise between shelters
and their residents, the rights and remedies of the women are often
an open legal question. At the very least, the overriding goal of the
courts seems clear-to allow women to recover from their former
abusers and become productive members of society.
How the residents of a shelter are categorized has immense impli-
cations for shelter operators. 3 If landlord-tenant law protects individ-
ual residents, shelters are unable to quickly evict problematic
residents who threaten the success and safety of the shelters. Thus,
although the legal status of shelter residents may be unclear, public
policy considerations overwhelmingly warn against protecting prob-
lematic residents at the expense of the success of shelters.4
Nonetheless, the starting point for analyzing the relationship
between shelters and their residents is landlord-tenant law. Accord-
ingly, Part I of this Note surveys general landlord-tenant common and
statutory law. Part II considers this framework in the context of shel-
ters. Finally, Part III examines the relevant public policy arguments,
concluding that applying landlord-tenant law to the context of shel-
ters ultimately compromises their ability to help victims of abuse most
effectively.
I. THE GENERAL LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP AND THE
PROHIBITION ON SELF-HELP EvIcrIONS
When women face eviction from their shelters, they most often
sue the shelter and allege a landlord-tenant relationship to reap the
legal benefits of such a relationship, which includes a prohibition on
3 For an analysis of the impact of potentially violent women on shelter programs,
see RESPECTING AccuRAcy IN DOMESTIC ABUSE REPORTING, HAS VAWA DELIVERED ON
ITS PROMISES TO WOMEN? 6-7 (2007), http://www.mediaradar.org/docs/VAWA-Has-
It-Delivered-on-Its-Promises-to-Women.pdf.
4 The abusiveness of some women is often overlooked-most policymakers
assume that women entering shelters are only victims. PHILIP W. COOK, ABUSED MEN
110 (1997); see also Linda Kelly, Disabusing the Definition of Domestic Abuse: How Women
Batter Men and the Role of the Feminist State, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 791, 848-49 (2003)
(discussing the development of the shelter movement and the need for effective mea-
sures to remedy habitual victims of domestic violence).
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self-help evictions. Thus, it is important to first consider landlord-ten-
ant law generally before applying it in the context of shelters.
A. The Creation of the Landlord-Tenant Relationship
Logically, before landlord-tenant law may apply to any situation, a
landlord-tenant relationship must exist. Determining whether such a
relationship has been created is thus the first step in analyzing both
the relevant statutory framework and the common law. Most states
have statutes defining both landlord and tenant, thus clarifying the
necessary elements of the relationship. 5 Many of these statutes also
define the residential premises to which they apply.6
Once it is established who is a landlord and who is a tenant, the
next inquiry regards the type of agreement that created the landlord-
tenant relationship. Courts have been willing to recognize both
express and implied agreements as forming such relationships. An
express agreement can be in the form of a lease, but may also be in
any form granting an individual the right to use a premises. 7 Courts
have been willing to find an implied landlord-tenant relationship
when the acts of the parties are consistent with such a landlord-tenant
relationship, even though there is no formal lease.8 Generally, the
relationship between the parties is the distinguishing feature of a
5 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2543(o) (2005) ("'Tenant' means a person enti-
tled under a rental agreement to occupy a dwelling unit to the exclusion of others.");
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.01 (A) (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2007) ("'Tenant'
means a person entitled under a rental agreement to the use and occupancy of resi-
dential premises to the exclusion of others.").
6 See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.01 (C) (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2007).
7 See Grant v. Detroit Ass'n of Women's Clubs, 505 N.W.2d 254, 258-59 (Mich.
1993). However, an agreement in the form of a lease usually implies a relationship of
landlord and tenant even if not expressly so stated. See, e.g., Misco Indus., Inc. v. Bd.
of County Comm'rs, 685 P.2d 866, 872 (Kan. 1984) ("A tenant is one who has the
temporary use and occupancy of the leased property belonging to another. The dura-
tion and other terms of the occupancy are usually defined by the lease agreement,
while the parties are placed in the relationship of landlord and tenant."); Tex. Co. v.
Butler, 256 P.2d 259, 263 (Or. 1953) ("[U]pon the execution of the lease and an
entry by the lessee upon the premises the relationship created between the parties is
that of landlord and tenant.").
8 See Van Pelt v. Russell, 203 S.W. 267, 268 (Ark. 1918) (" [T] he relation of land-
lord and tenant is always created by contract, either express or implied, and it will
never be implied when the acts and conduct of the parties are inconsistent with its
existence."); Beck v. Minn. & W. Grain Co., 107 N.W. 1032, 1033 (Iowa 1906) ("The
relation of landlord and tenant is created by contract, either expressed or implied, by
the terms of which one person designated 'tenant' enters into possession of the land
under another known as 'landlord."'); Hellebush v. Tischbein Apothecaries, Inc., 6
N.E.2d 584, 585 (Ohio Ct. App. 1936) ("Taking or continuing in possession, and pay-
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landlord-tenant relationship, as opposed to which party has title in the
property. 9
Mere agreement, without certain other factors, is insufficient to
create a landlord-tenant relationship. In order for a landlord-tenant
relationship to exist, each of the following elements must be present:
(1) a reversion in the landlord; (2) the creation of an estate in the
tenant either at will or for a term less than that which the landlord
holds; (3) the transfer of exclusive possession and control of the
premises, or a portion thereof, to the tenant; and (4) a contract,
either express or implied, between the parties. 10
Courts are reluctant to find a landlord-tenant relationship where the
would-be landlord is merely a rent collector and nothing more. I1
Whether possession has been transferred to a prospective ten-
ant-the third requirement for the formation of a landlord-tenant
relationship-is a crucial element of the test, particularly with respect
to shelters.' 2 For example, a landlord-tenant relationship is not cre-
ated in cases of a hotel guest or transient lodgers, as courts consider
these individuals to be licensees. 13 Indeed, one of the distinguishing
features of the hotel-guest relationship-the fact that exclusive posses-
sion has not been transferred-is a particularly relevant distinction to
shelters.' 4 The middle ground between landlord-tenant and hotel-
guest is nonetheless elusive, and courts have tried to factually distin-
guish cases to categorize them. 15
ment of rent, manifest an intention to create a tenancy, no other form of expressing
such intent being required by any statute.").
9 See Estes v. Gatliff, 163 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Ky. Ct. App. 1942) ("The relation of
land-lord [sic] and tenant does not depend upon the landlord's title but upon the
agreement.").
10 Letsinger v. Drury Coll., 68 S.W.3d 408, 411 (Mo. 2002); see also Grant, 505
N.W.2d at 258 n.6 (noting that all of the elements must be present).
11 Rittenberg v. Donohoe Constr. Co., 426 A.2d 338, 341 (D.C. 1981) ("Simply
collecting rents for a landlord does not create a landlord-tenant relationship between
the tenant and the rental agent entitling the tenant to a claim against the rental agent
for damages for breach of his lease agreement, and for constructive eviction by his
landlord.").
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 1.2 (1977 & Supp.
2007).
13 See Roberts v. Casey, 93 P.2d 654, 659 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1939).
14 See infta Part II.B.2.
15 See generally Robert H. Kelley, Any Reports of the Death of the Property Law Paradigm
for Leases Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 41 WAYNE L. REv. 1563, 1569 (1995) (noting
the wide variety of ways courts treat leases).
(VOL. 83:1
CRUSADING FOR THE HELPLESS
B. More Complex Landlord-Tenant Relationships
On the outer bounds of landlord-tenant jurisprudence, courts
have historically been unwilling to recognize a landlord-tenant rela-
tionship in the case of an employment contract that also includes
accommodations provided by the employer. In 1895, the Michigan
Supreme Court held that a teacher with a contract that included a
schoolhouse apartment did not have a landlord-tenant relationship
with the school district. 16 The court focused on the terms of the
employment agreement, finding there was "no letting in terms, no
rent reserved, and where it is clear that the purpose of the occupancy
was to enable the employe [sic] to perform the service of his
employer. '17 The teacher was therefore not entitled to a traditional
landlord-tenant relationship despite occupying the schoolhouse apart-
ment.18 The court did find, however, that a tenancy at sufferance
could be created upon the termination of the employment agreement
because the teacher still lived on the premises. 19 This example under-
scores the fluidity of the landlord-tenant relationship-it may be cre-
ated by a tenant staying on the premises after the expiration of the
agreement, even though the agreement itself did not create the
relationship.
The Michigan Supreme Court changed this direction of landlord-
tenant case law through its watershed decision in Grant v. Detroit Ass'n
of Women's Clubs,20 which recognized a landlord-tenant relationship
for employees living on the premises of an employer. 2 1 In Grant, an
employer terminated his employee and subsequently changed the
locks on the former employee's apartment. 22 The court's decision
expanded the notion of the landlord-tenant relationship, holding that
"[t]here is no inconsistency between the relation of landlord and
tenant and that of master and servant, and, where it appears that
the occupation of the master's premises is not treated by the parties
themselves as a mere incident of the service, and the master has
parted with the control of the premises, it may be regarded in law as
an occupation as tenant, even though the rental is satisfied in whole
or in part by the services rendered."
23
16 Sch. Dist. No. 11 v. Batsche, 64 N.W. 196, 197 (Mich. 1895).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 505 N.W.2d 254, 258 (Mich. 1993).
21 Id. at 258.
22 Id. at 256.
23 Id. at 258 (quoting 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant, § 6(2), at 40 (1968)).
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This recognition of a landlord-tenant relationship altered the view
that the transfer of an estate to a tenant was the defining element of
the landlord-tenant relationship.24 Part of the rationale for extending
the relationship was "the fact that a landlord wears two hats, landlord
and employer, [which] does not excuse the landlord from compliance
both with housing and employment laws."25 This is evidence of the
court's resort to public policy rather than the common law in constru-
ing the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship.
C. The Typical Characteristics of a Landlord-Tenant Relationship
An ordinary landlord-tenant relationship involves the tenant con-
tracting with the landlord for a residence, typically for the occupancy
of an apartment or house.2 6 The primary aim of this relationship is
generally related to a living space and nothing more. 27 While the
landlord may place burdens on the tenant's use of the premises, he is
not usually trying to change the behavior of the tenant and the tenant
is not seeking to be changed. 28 The landlord's primary concern in
the traditional relationship is the monthly consideration he receives
from the tenant.
On the other hand, the relationship between a victim and a shel-
ter is different. The victim is usually distressed and needs a place to
stay, but more importantly, needs to separate herself from the abusive
environment she is fleeing.29 At the same time, she needs help
becoming self-reliant and rebuilding her life so that she may be pro-
24 See Gerald Korngold, Whatever Happened to Landlord-Tenant Law?, 77 NEB. L.
REv. 703, 709 (1998) (noting that the distinction between a general contract and the
conveyance of an estate is questionable).
25 Grant, 505 N.W.2d at 259.
26 See 52 CJ.S. Landlord and Tenant, § 5 (2003).
27 See 52 CJ.S. Landlord and Tenant, § 2, at 63 (2003) ("The landlord-tenant rela-
tionship exists only with respect to a space that is intended to have a fixed location for
the duration of the lease.").
28 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 822 (2001) ("[P]robably the most important attribute of a lease
from the tenant's perspective is the transfer of in rem rights associated with owner-
ship for the duration of the lease term.").
29 See Weiner, supra note 2, at 187 ("'If there were no shelter, I wouldn't have left
home because there was nowhere else for me to go. Both my parents are dead and I
have no other family. My friends fear my husband .... Without the Shelter, I know
that I would be dead now. My husband would have beaten me to death or would have
shot me."' (quoting Victims of Crime: Hearings onJK 2786, HR. 3352, and H.R_ 3678
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong.
52-53 (1987) (statement of Wendy Gourdeau))).
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ductive again.30 These needs require a structured arrangement
whereby the victim can learn to live independently. 31 Housing pro-
grams thus help women by means of a multi-step process that progres-
sively teaches them how to live independently of their former
abusers.32
A victim's relationship with a shelter is also unique because shel-
ter occupants sign residency agreements for the services of the pro-
gram, rather than merely for housing accommodations.3 3 Many of
the victims are forced out of their homes due to conditions that vary
from domestic violence to poverty.34 These victims need much more
than accommodations if they are to become independent from their
former abusers. The shelters provide them with specific programs
which are narrowly tailored to solve each participant's problems. For
example, a single YWCA can have two separate programs in the same
facility-one for women who are homeless and one for women fleeing
domestic violence. 35 The extent of a program's intervention in its
residents' lives and the requirements of participation also vary widely
among shelters. Some merely require the participant to look for work
that will allow her to find permanent living accommodations, while
others involve a multi-step program whereby the individual is gradu-
30 See Mullins, supra note 1, at 249-50 ("[W]omen are able to regain control over
their lives with the support of the shelter's staff and counseling programs.").
31 See STEPHEN COLEMAN, MINN. CTR. AGAINST VIOLENCE & ABUSE, AN EVALUATION
OF MINNESOTA'S SHELTER PROGRAM FOR BATFERED WOMEN, (2001), http://www.
mincava.umn.edu/documents/shelter/shelter.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2007)
("When a woman enters a shelter, the shelter staff works with her to develop a plan of
action for her time in the shelter. The plan addresses the issues that she cites as
important to enhance her safety and move her on to a better living situation.").
32 See Weiner, supra note 2, at 189 ("Shelters try to help women see their options
and reach decisions. For example, Women's Advocates, in Minneapolis, does
'whatever possible to help a battered woman reassert control over her life: accompany
her to the hospital or help her find a new apartment, apply for welfare or get a court
order for protection .... [T]he shelter often provides child care so women can meet
with their attorneys or attend classes and support groups.'" (quoting George Howe
Colt, Stop! For God's Sake Stop!, LIFE, Oct. 1988, at 120, 125)).
33 See COLEMAN, supra note 31 (discussing EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R.
FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS (1988), and noting that, "[i]n their extensive
study of women in battered women's shelters in Texas, Gondolf and Fisher discussed
how shelters have evolved from simply providing refuge to offering many other
services.")).
34 See Serreze v. YWCA of W. Mass., Inc., 572 N.E.2d 581, 584 (Mass. App. Ct.
1991).
35 YWCA Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 2, Coyne v. YWCA Greater Toledo, No. CVG-06-15975 (Ohio Mun. Ct.,
Sept. 6, 2006) (noting the parallel nature of the battered woman's shelter and the
homeless shelter programs).
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ally granted greater freedoms. 36 Each program therefore differs in
the level of involvement by the shelter.
D. Statutory Prohibitions on Landlord Self-Help Remedies
An essential aspect of landlord-tenant law, particularly in the con-
text of shelters, is the eviction process. Self-help eviction was a com-
mon law practice whereby a landlord can enter the premises and evict
a tenant unlawfully holding over.3 7 Most states have rejected self-help
remedies in landlord-tenant statutes, instead forcing a landlord to go
to a court and seek an eviction order.3 8 This change was primarily
aimed at preserving the peace. 39
Anti-self-help eviction statutes only apply when a landlord-tenant
relationship actually exists. 40 Some state statutes, however, are more
36 See, e.g., Serreze, 572 N.E.2d at 582-83 ("The TLP program, a blend of housing
and social services, is unique in that it is designed .. .[to provide] comprehensive
,second stage' support for selected families seeking transition to a life independent of
their former abusers."); Ann Arbor Tenants Union v. Ann Arbor YMCA, 581 N.W.2d
794, 798 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) ("[T]he YMCA will assist its residents in finding per-
manent housing.").
37 See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 71 (1972) ("[T]he common law also per-
mitted the landlord to 'enter and expel the tenant by force, without being liable to an
action of tort for damages, either for his entry upon the premises, or for an assault in
expelling the tenant, provided he uses no more force than is necessary ....' (quot-
ing Smith v. Reeder, 28 P. 890, 891 (Or. 1892))); 2 MILTON R. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON
LEASES § 18:6 (Patrick A. Randolph, Jr. ed., 5th ed. 2006).
38 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 14.3 (1977 &
Supp. 2007).
39 Id. § 14.3 cmt. a.
40 "The statute [s are] applicable only to a case where the relationship of landlord
and tenant actually exists. The courts of other jurisdictions, in construing similar
statutes, have generally, if not universally, held that, in order to maintain such sum-
mary proceedings, it is essential that the conventional relation of landlord and tenant
exist." Stewart-Jones Co. v. Shehan, 121 S.E. 374, 376 (S.C. 1924); see also MICH.
COMP. LAws § 600.2918(2) (1979) ("Any tenant in possession of premises whose pos-
sessory interest has been unlawfully interfered with by the owner, lessor, licensor, or
their agents shall be entitled to recover the amount of his actual damages ....");
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.15(A) (LexisNexis 2004) ("No landlord of residential
premises shall initiate any act, including termination of utilities or services, exclusion
from the premises, or threat of any unlawful act, against a tenant ...."); Ann Arbor,
581 N.W.2d. at 798 ("The distinction between a guest and a tenant is significant
whereby a guest is not entitled to notice of termination and can be the subject of self-
help eviction, including a lockout, by the proprietor, while a tenant has protection
against such measures."); John V. Orth, Who is a Tenant? The Correct Definition of the
Status in North Carolina, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 79, 81 (1995) ("Now that so much depends
on whether the party fits within a certain category, it has become crucial to know who
qualifies for membership.").
[VOL. 83:1
CRUSADING FOR THE HELPLESS
broadly applicable than others.4' For example, the Massachusetts
Code provides that "any lessor or landlord of any building or part
thereof occupied for dwelling purposes" may not resort to self-help in
evicting a tenant. 42 Courts interpreting this statute have broadly con-
strued the terms "lessor" and "landlord," opining that the terms
evince a legislative intent to expand the statute's applicability beyond
just a landlord-tenant relationship. 43
The applicability of these statutes to shelters is particularly impor-
tant. If shelters are subject to landlord-tenant statutes, their managers
may have trouble evicting problem residents. 44 Thus, the characteri-
zation of shelter occupants as either guests or tenants is of paramount
importance in determining the legal ramifications of their relation-
ship with the shelter.
II. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
RESIDENTS AND THEIR SHELTERS
Having considered the general framework of landlord-tenant
common law, this Note next turns to the legal status of shelter
residents. Although landlord-tenant law is relatively well-defined by
state statutory law, it is not easily applicable to the context of shelters.
Most state statutes do not even attempt to address the rules governing
shelters. Courts have therefore varied in their approaches to land-
lord-tenant statutes in the context of shelters.
A. Relevant Statutory Law
Many of the common law rules determining the nature of land-
lord-tenant relationships have been abrogated by state statutes, which
vary as to their application and scope. For the most part, state land-
lord-tenant statutes can be divided into three main categories: those
41 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007) ("No lessee or
tenant... may be removed ... from any house ... leased for residential purposes,
other than (1) . . . a hotel, motel or other guest house or part thereof rented to a
transient guest or seasonal tenant.., except upon establishment of... good cause.").
The Colorado forcible entry and detainer statute defines forcible entry, which pre-
vents any entry upon the premises unlawfully, and then defines situations in which it
would be unlawful for a landlord to enter upon the premises for purposes of exclud-
ing a tenant. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 13-40-101 to 13-40-104 (2007).
42 See MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 186, § 14 (2007).
43 See Serreze v. YWCA of W. Mass., Inc., 572 N.E.2d 581, 584 (Mass. App. Ct.
1991); see also MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 186, § 14 (2007) (using the terms landlord or
lessor).
44 See infra Part III.B.
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that directly exclude certain arrangements from their scope,45 those
that define tenants and residential premises broadly and vaguely,46
and those that define their applications broadly but rely on common
law definitions to limit their scope.4 7 Some states define the terms
"landlord," "tenant," and "residential premises" to determine what is
covered by their landlord-tenant acts. 48 Others use broader language,
such as "landlord or lessor," in defining the extent to which common
law principles are abrogated. 49
Certain states have also adopted various versions of the Uniform
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act without explicitly clarifying
whether shelters qualify as landlords. 50 The Uniform Act exempts
45 For an example of a broadly defined exclusion, see ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-
1308 (2007) ("Unless created to avoid the application of this chapter, the following
arrangements are not covered by this chapter: 1. Residence at an institution, public or
private, if incidental to detention, the provision of medical, educational, counseling
or religious services or the provision of a social service program that is provided by a
social service provider. For the purposes of this paragraph, 'social service provider'
means a private entity that directly assists an individual or family in obtaining housing
and that offers to provide the individual or family with assistance in obtaining employ-
ment, child care, health care, education, skills training, transportation, counseling or
any other related service."); see also N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW § 713 (McKinney
2007) (defining the relationships outside the scope of the landlord-tenant act); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.01(C) (LexisNexis 2004) (excluding certain arrangements
from the statutory definition of "residential premises," which defines the scope of the
Ohio Landlord-Tenant Act).
46 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2543(o) (2005) ("'Tenant' means a person enti-
tled under a rental agreement to occupy a dwelling unit to the exclusion of others.");
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-40(2) (2005) ("'Premises' means a dwelling unit, including
mobile homes or mobile home spaces, and the structure of which it is a part and
facilities and appurtenances therein and grounds, areas, and facilities normally held
out for the use of residential tenants.").
47 See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.002 (Vernon 2007) ("This chapter applies
only to the relationship between landlords and tenants of residential rental prop-
erty."); see also COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-40-104 (2007) (enumerating instances in which
forcible entry is unlawful); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-59.2 (West 2006) ("This act shall
not apply to a hotel, motel or other guest house, or part thereof, rented to a transient
guest or seasonal tenant, or a residential health care facility . . . ."); N.Y. REAL PROP.
AcTs. LAW § 711 (McKinney 2007) ("A tenant shall include an occupant of one or
more rooms in a rooming house or a resident, not including a transient occupant, of
one or more rooms in a hotel who has been in possession for thirty consecutive days
or longer .... "); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-39(a) (2005) ("The provisions of this Article
shall not apply to transient occupancy in a hotel, motel, or similar lodging subject to
regulation by the Commission for Health Services.").
48 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.01 (LexisNexis 2004).
49 One such state is Massachusetts. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, § 14 (2007).
50 For an example of an exclusion that only applies if unintentionally used, see
IOWA CODE ANN. § 562A.5 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007) ("Unless created to avoid the
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from its coverage "residence at an institution, public or private, if inci-
dental to detention or the provision of medical, geriatric, educational,
counseling, religious, or similar service." 51 A fair interpretation can
either accept or reject the landlord-tenant relationship in the case of
shelters. 52 Courts must therefore tackle the statutes based on the
common law and legislative intent.
The Uniform Act raises special questions of applicability: it
exempts certain arrangements from landlord-tenant requirements
"[u]nless created to avoid the application of [the] Act."53 The Ore-
gon Supreme Court interpreted this section in Burke v. Oxford House of
Oregon Chapter V54 and found that while the defendant's program
application of this chapter, the following arrangements are not governed by this chap-
ter: 1. Residence at an institution, public or private, if incidental to detention or the
provision of medical, geriatric, educational, counseling, religious, or similar ser-
vice .. . ."); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-2 (2007) ("Unless created to avoid the
application of this chapter. . . , the following arrangements are not governed by this
chapter ... : (1) Residence at an institution, public or private, if incidental to deten-
tion or the provision of medical, geriatric, educational, counseling or religious ser-
vice, or any similar service ...."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2541 (2005) ("Unless created
to avoid the application of this act, the following arrangements are not governed by
this act: (a) Residence at an institution, public or private, if incidental to detention or
the provision of medical, geriatric, educational, counseling, religious or similar ser-
vice ...."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1408 (2003) ("Unless created to avoid the applica-
tion of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, the following
arrangements are not governed by the act: (1) Residence at an institution, public or
private, if incidental to detention or the provision of medical, geriatric, educational,
counseling, religious, or similar service."); OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, § 102 (2001) ("Unless
the context otherwise requires ...."); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.5(A) (2003) ("Except
as specifically made applicable .... the following conditions are not governed by this
chapter: 1. Residence at a public or private institution, if incidental to detention or
the provision of medical, geriatric, educational, counseling, religious or similar ser-
vices .... ). For an example of a state statute that excludes arrangements similar to
shelters without regard to the awareness of the parties, see FLA. STAT. § 83.42 (2007)
("This part does not apply to: (1) Residency or detention in a facility, whether public
or private, when residence or detention is incidental to the provision of medical, geri-
atric, educational, counseling, religious, or similar services."); see also Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 383.535 (West 2006) ("The following arrangements are not governed by KRS
383.505 to 383.715: (1) Residence at an institution, public or private, if incidental to
detention or the provision of medical, geriatric, educational counseling, religious, or
similar service.").
51 UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT AcT § 1.202, 7B U.L.A. 297-98 (2006).
52 See, e.g., YMCA of Stamford v. Bentley, 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 397, 400-01 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2004) (finding the Stamford YMCA exempt from the Residential Landlord-
Tenant Act on the ground that the YMCA is a social or fraternal organization within
the meaning of the exemption statute.).
53 UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT AcT § 1.202, 7B U.L.A. 297-98 (2006).
54 137 P.3d 1278 (Or. 2006).
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arrangements would otherwise have been exempt under the Act,
defendant was aware of the Act and instructed its contracting officer
how to sign the residency agreements so as to avoid triggering the
landlord-tenant provisions.55 As a result, the shelter was subject to the
landlord-tenant rules and its eviction of plaintiff was improper.
56
The arrangements in Oxford House-which would have been
protected from the landlord-tenant relationship if the Burke court had
not found avoidance of the Act-differed from those in traditional
shelters;57 but these differences should not be legally sufficient to
deprive any shelter of protection from the landlord-tenant framework.
Oxford House is a program for recovering alcoholics that allows a
group to live together in a house with communal facilities.58 Each
house operates independently and members democratically solve
problems, with the proviso that anyone who relapses shall be evicted
immediately.59 The effectiveness of the homes is largely due to the
strict nature of the house rules and the severity of the punishment for
relapse. 60 Thus, the basic difference between Oxford House and
traditional shelters-the characteristic that exempted it from land-
lord-tenant law-is the extent to which the participants in the shelter
program live autonomously. Following Burke, Oregon shelters want-
ing to ensure their eviction rights may have chosen to follow the
Oxford House model. In other words, they would have to become
55 Id. at 1282.
56 Id.
57 According to those who have been in shelter programs, however, the arrange-
ments in Oxford House were ideal in helping women through domestic violence,
"[T]he women themselves find the shelter environment more important than its ser-
vices. In a follow-up survey of sixty-two women who had stayed at the YWCA Women's
Emergency Shelter in Santa Rosa, California, over half said that the best thing that
happened for them at the shelter was the sensitive sustaining support from staff and
residents." Weiner, supra note 2, at 272-73 (citing Nancy Peterson, Beyond Battery: A
Follow-up Study of Residents of a Woman's Shelter 16 (Sept. 1980)).
58 Burke, 137 P.3d at 1279.
59 Id. For an analysis of a shelter in Germany that was effective in facilitating self-
help, see Weiner, supra note 2, at 275 ("Self-help is the philosophy of the women's
houses. 'Women who work in the houses give newcomers the necessary information
concerning the operation of the house and advise the women on legal and medical
questions. The battered women themselves organize everything else. They answer
the phones, take care of newcomers at night and on weekends, and accompany each
other to social service agencies. The most important aspect of self-help, however, is
that the women talk with each other and learn that their experiences are not
unique."' (quoting The Shelter Movement in West Germany, RESPONSE TO THE VICTIMIZA-
TION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN, Spring 1985, at 27)).
60 See Burke v. Oxford House of Or. Chapter V, 103 P.3d 1184, 1185-86 (Or. Ct.
App. 2004) (en banc), rev'd, 137 P.3d 1278 (Or. 2006).
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more intrusive into the lives of the participants to guarantee that they
do not inadvertently create a landlord-tenant relationship. Such judi-
cial tampering with the structures of shelters is undoubtedly problem-
atic. Most importantly, shelters would be deprived of the flexibility to
experiment with programs that yield the most effective results.
Thus, the Oregon Supreme Court's interpretation of the Uni-
form Residential Landlord and Tenant Act indicates that despite the
apparent limits on the Act's reach, courts are willing to interpret it
broadly-even if it is to the detriment of shelters. Complicating the
law surrounding shelters further, the Act and its adaptations are sub-
ject to extensive and widely varying judicial interpretations.
B. Judicial Interpretation of Statutory Law
The structure of state statutes defining the scope of the landlord-
tenant relationship is the primary basis on which courts have decided
whether residents have a landlord-tenant relationship with their shel-
ters. To date, courts have mostly focused on statutory definitions and,
to a lesser extent, on statutory exclusions. 6 1
Nevertheless, courts are often driven by an urge to find a remedy
when a sympathetic participant has been evicted from a shelter. The
most significant drawback to this approach is its potential to adversely
affect future participants in the program by hindering shelters' ability
to evict problematic residents who threaten others. Thus, courts must
be weary of broadly construing the relevant statutes as providing shel-
ter residents with extensive tenant rights.
Despite the negative consequences of endowing shelter residents'
with unrestricted tenant rights, courts are split as to whether shelters
have landlord-tenant relationships with their residents. A few of them
have found that such a relationship exists; and that therefore the shel-
ters may not evict residents without a court order. Others have pur-
sued the opposite line of reasoning, finding no landlord-relationship
between shelters and their residents.
1. Finding a Landlord-Tenant Relationship in the Context of
Shelters
In Higdon v. Sign of the Cross Housing, Inc. , 6 2 an Ohio court found
that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between a nonprofit faith-
61 See, e.g., Baker v. Rushing, 409 S.E.2d 108, 112-13 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (ana-
lyzing both the definition of landlord and the exclusions sections of the North Caro-
lina Landlord-Tenant Act).
62 803 N.E.2d 876 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 2003).
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based housing project and its occupants. 63 The conditions of the
faith-based program were as follows: participants could remain in pro-
gram housing for a maximum of 180 days; they had to pay a fee at the
beginning of the month but no security deposit; and they had to par-
ticipate in the faith-based program. 64 The plaintiff had moved into a
unit affiliated with the group and brought her own furniture. 65 When
she failed to pay her monthly fee, the locks on the door were
changed. 66 In deciding whether a landlord-tenant relationship
existed, the court looked primarily to a section of the Ohio Landlord-
Tenant Act excluding emergency shelters for transient occupants
from the definition of residential premises. 67 The court decided that
the service provided by Sign of the Cross was neither on an emergency
basis nor transitory in nature.68 Thus, the court held the Act to apply,
creating a landlord-tenant relationship. 69 Accordingly, defendant
Sign of the Cross was required to follow the statutory procedures for
evicting the plaintiff, who was entitled to relief for its failure to do
so.
70
The decision in Higdon seems isolated in the sense that it focused
solely on the "emergency shelter" exception in the Ohio Landlord-
Tenant Act.71 The court also neglected an alternate provision in the
statute, which provided an exemption for (1) tax-exempt organiza-
tions that operated "single room occupancy facilities" 72 in charitable
programs and (2) shelters "for victims of domestic violence, or home-
less persons. '73 The court's lack of analysis of this alternate exception
in the Ohio Landlord-Tenant Act could have resulted either from an
oversight by the judges or from their desire to constrain programs
that wished to operate shelters. If the former, Higdon is indeed
unique; if the latter, the Ohio Landlord-Tenant Act severely limits the
ability of shelters to structure their programs to achieve maximum
effectiveness. The court's ruling therefore seems to imply that the
exemption as written only applies to shelters that operate dormitory
style programs. Nonetheless, Higdon raises the question of the extent
63 Id. at 880-81.
64 Id. at 877.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 878.
67 Id. at 878-79.
68 Id. at 879.
69 Id. at 879.
70 Id. at 880-81.
71 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.01(C)(10) (LexisNexis 2004).
72 See id. § 3731.01 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007) (defining single room occupancy
facilities).
73 Id. § 5321.01 (C) (9) (b) (ii) (LexisNexis 2004).
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to which organizations providing shelter are exempt from the Land-
lord-Tenant Act.
In a decision utilizing a more universal and less technical
approach, a Massachusetts court found a landlord-tenant relationship
to exist in a traditional shelter situation. In Serreze v. YWCA of Western
Massachusetts, Inc.,74 the court was faced with the question of whether
abused women were protected from self-help eviction by the YWCA. 75
The YWCA operated a transitional living program where victims of
abuse could reside while working to become self-sufficient.7 6 In addi-
tion to receiving housing, the program's participants were required to
either work or attend school, and to frequent counseling and voca-
tional guidance sessions. 77 The program's goal was to facilitate an
independent lifestyle for former victims of abuse.78 Since the pro-
gram was subsidized by the state, the Code of Massachusetts Regula-
tions applied to the rent charged for the program, capping the fee at
twenty-five percent of the participant's income. 79 In the case, a dis-
pute erupted between some program participants and the YWCA and
the participants stopped attending the counseling sessions.80 The
YWCA responded by changing the locks on the apartments, prevent-
ing participants from returning to their rooms.81 The participants
brought suit against the YWCA, asserting that they had a landlord-
tenant relationship with the YWCA and their eviction constituted a
violation of the Massachusetts anti-self-help eviction statute.8 2
Although the court recognized that "the regulatory scheme underly-
ing the transitional housing program suggests an intention to 'depart
from traditional concepts of the landlord-tenant relationship,"' it
found that the statute prohibiting self-help evictions applied to, and
was violated by, the YWCA.8 3 Specifically, the court held that the rela-
tionship between the residents and the shelter was akin to a landlord-
tenant relationship, requiring an eviction procedure to remove the
women.
84
74 572 N.E.2d 581 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
75 Id. at 582.
76 Id. at 582-83.
77 Id. at 583.
78 Id. at 582-83.
79 Id. at 583 n.6 (citing 760 MAss. CODE REGS. § 7.02 (1986)).
80 Id. at 583.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 582.
83 Id. at 583 (quoting Spence v. O'Brien, 446 N.E.2d 1070, 1075 (Mass. App. Ct.
1983)).
84 Id. at 584.
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While Higdon and Serreze expanded the rights of resident women,
they prevented shelters from quickly evicting threatening residents.8 5
However, the extent to which shelters are bound by anti-self-help evic-
tion statutes remained unclear: the courts did not state under what
circumstances shelters would be exempt from the statutes. 86 Further-
more, as these court decisions were based on public policy, they may
not be applicable to different sets of facts. For example, what if a
participant becomes violent or destructive?87 Perhaps to address this
issue, the Serreze court implicitly reserved the right to exempt a shelter
from the statute, noting that "[t]he plaintiffs have manifested no
behavioral disorders justifying substantive limitations on their living
accommodations, nor has there been any allegation that the plaintiffs
substantially interfered with the rights of other occupants." 88 None-
theless, Serreze doubtlessly provided strong precedent for finding a
landlord-tenant relationship between a shelter and its residents.
2. Exempting Shelters from the Landlord-Tenant Relationship
In an opposing line of cases, certain courts have found shelters
exempt from state landlord-tenant acts. One of the primary means
for analyzing the relationship in these cases has been the extent to
which program participants have a possessory interest in their rooms.
In Thomas v. Cohen,89 three women from a shelter program sued after
being evicted. The shelter in question operated as the last step in a
program to get homeless women off the street.9° As a requirement of
staying in the shelter, women had to be employed and pay a monthly
fee of $140.91 Additionally, the women had to complete chores
around the house.92 Each resident had an individual room and could
use communal living areas.93
In deciding Thomas, the court first looked to the exclusions from
the act.94 Specifically, the Kentucky Uniform Residential Landlord
85 Meanwhile, the Serreze court dismissed claims that its decision would hurt shel-
ters. See id. at 584.
86 See Baker v. Rushing, 409 S.E.2d 108, 112 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (emphasizing
that the distinguishing factor for determining who is a tenant is whether the property
serves as a prospective tenant's primary residence).
87 See infra Part III.
88 Serreze, 572 N.E.2d at 584 n.1l.
89 453 F.3d 657 (6th Cir. 2006).
90 Id. at 659.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 660.
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and Tenant Act (KURLTA) exempted "[r] esidence at an institution,
public or private, if incidental to detention or the provision of medi-
cal, geriatric, educational counseling, religious, or similar service." 95
The court therefore concluded that the women lacked any property
interest in the shelter and fell outside the scope of the Kentucky Act. 9 6
Accordingly, the plaintiffs did not have rights under the Act as the
exclusion applied to the facility in which they lived.9 7
Next, the court interpreted the definition of "tenant" in the stat-
ute to determine its applicability to shelter residents. The Kentucky
Act "defines a tenant as 'a person entitled under a rental agreement
to occupy a dwelling unit to the exclusion of others. "' 98 In construing
the Act, the court questioned whether the shelter occupants were
"'entitled under a rental agreement' to occupy [the shelter] or their
individual bedrooms 'to the exclusion of others."' 99 The court deter-
mined that "plaintiffs failed to qualify as tenants under the KURLTA
because they have presented no evidence that they had a right to
exclusive possession of [the shelter] or their individual bedrooms."' 10 0
This outcome-finding against a landlord-tenant relationship in the
context of shelters-is typical when courts focus their analysis on
whether a shelter occupant was in exclusive possession of the
premises. 10 1
In Coyne v. YWCA Greater Toledo,102 an Ohio court also examined
the possessory interest of a participant in a different YWCA program.
The court distinguished the rights of the YWCA to enter the premises
from the rights of an ordinary landlord.10 3 In the case of the YWCA,
the right to enter the premises at any time for such things as inspec-
tions prevented the program participants from ever having exclusive
possession of their rooms.'0 4 On the contrary, in the case of an ordi-
nary landlord-tenant relationship, the landlord could enter upon the
premises only for specific purposes. 10 5 Thus, because the residency
95 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.535(1) (West 2006).
96 Thomas, 453 F.3d at 660-62.
97 Id. at 660 (quoting § 383.535(1)).
98 Id. at 662 (quoting § 383.545(15)).
99 Id. at 662-63 (quoting § 383.545(15)).
100 Id. at 662.
101 See, e.g., Ann Arbor Tenants Union v. Ann Arbor YMCA, 581 N.W.2d 794
(Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that shelter resident did not have exclusive possession
of the premises).
102 No. CVG-06-15975 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Nov. 7, 2006).
103 Coyne, slip op. at 5 (citing Coleman v. Faith Mission, No. O1CVH-10988 (Ohio
Ct. Com. P1. Jan. 17, 2002)).
104 See id.
105 See id.
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agreement reserved the right of the YWCA to enter the room of the
plaintiff at any time, there was no transfer of possession that would
facilitate the creation of a landlord-tenant relationship. 10 6
Michigan courts have also looked to whether the residents of a
shelter have an exclusive possessory interest in the property based on
their residency agreements. In Ann Arbor Tenants Union v. Ann Arbor
YMCA, 10 7 the court analyzed a residency agreement and found that it
did "not contain language evidencing an intent to form a landlord-
tenant relationship."' 0 8 The court found that since the 'YMCA specif-
ically reserve [d] the right to ask a guest to leave a room at any time,"
the agreement did not create a possessory interest in the property and
therefore no landlord-tenant relationship existed.' 0 9 The court noted
that instead of being provided a specific room, "the guest explicitly
acknowledges that 'he or she is not a tenant but a licensee on a day-to-
day basis, and that [the] Guest has no property or possessory interest
in the room being rented to [the] Guest."' 1 10 Finally, the court
opined that "the residents of the YMCA simply do not have the requi-
site exclusive possession and control of their premises during the
period of their occupancy to give rise to a tenancy. " "'1
In reaching its decision, the Ann Arbor court primarily focused on
the common law notion that the residency agreement is the crucial
factor in determining whether a landlord-tenant relationship exists,
noting that the "legal relationship established by the renting of a
room generally depends on the intention of the parties, gathered
from the terms of the parties' contract and interpreted in light of sur-
rounding facts and circumstances." 1 2 Interestingly, the court did not
focus on statutory construction in construing the agreement, which
suggests that a purely common law approach would lead courts to
conclude that shelter residents are not entitled to protection under
state landlord-tenant legislation.
Courts have also been willing to distinguish the relationship
between shelters and their occupants from traditional landlord-tenant
relationships on the ground that the relationship can be considered
106 See id.
107 581 N.W.2d 794 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
108 Id. at 799. For an example of a New Jersey court finding no landlord-tenant
relationship in the case of the YMCA where rooms were rented on a week-to-week
basis, see Poroznoff v. Alberti, 391 A.2d 984, 986-87 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1978), afJ'd, 401
A.2d 1124 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
109 Ann Arbor, 581 N.W.2d at 799.
110 Id. at 800.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 798.
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that of hotel-guest rather than landlord-tenant. l -3 In Ann Arbor, for
example, the court found that the relationship was one of hotel-guest
and not landlord-tenant.'1 4 In support, it noted that the YMCA's
accommodations consisted of "communal bathroom facilities at one
end of the hall containing several showers, sinks, urinals, and toilets to
be used by the occupants of the floor. Each room is occupied by one
person and is furnished by the YMCA with a single bed, a closet, a
desk, and a chair."'" 5 Furthermore, the room keys were at the YMCA
front desk while residents were away and the YMCA "reserve[d] the
right to enter the rooms for purposes of security, inspection, and
maintenance."' 16 The YMCA also required that the residents sign an
agreement that used the terms "hotel" and "guest."'1 7 In the resi-
dency agreement, the YMCA retained "the right to terminate a guest's
occupancy and ask the guest to leave at any time and without any rea-
son and that if the guest does not do so voluntarily within twenty-four
hours upon request, the YMCA may lock the guest out of the room
without further notice."' 1 8
Another factor the Ann Arbor court found to support the hotel-
guest relationship was an agreement the YMCA had concluded with
the City of Ann Arbor, providing that the 'YMCA would 'continue to
use its best efforts to refer residents to appropriate social agencies,
including, but not limited to, mental health services, job skill and job
placement services and assistance in finding permanent affordable hous-
ing. ' 1 1 9 The court inferred that "finding permanent housing" meant
that the YMCA could not be the plaintiffs' permanent residence, as in
a traditional landlord-tenant relationship.120 Since the court found
113 See, e.g., Poroznoff 391 A.2d at 986-87 (holding the relationship between a
YMCA and its guests to be one of hotel-guest rather than landlord-tenant). See gener-
ally Amy M. Campbell, Note, When a Hotel Is Your Home, Is There Protection?-Baker v.
Rushing, 15 CAMPBELL L. REv. 295, 296 (1993) (discussing North Carolina landlord-
tenant law with respect to hotel-guest distinctions).
114 Another motivation for finding this relationship is that some states do not
include a blanket exemption for shelters from a landlord-tenant act without a finding
that the residents are licensees. See N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTS. LAw § 713 (McKinney
2006).
115 Ann Arbor, 581 N.W.2d at 796.
116 Id. at 796.
117 Id. at 796-97.
118 Id. at 797.
119 Id. For another example of a court focusing on the goal of finding other
housing, see Helping Out People Everywhere v. Deich, 589 N.Y.S.2d 744, 747 (City Ct.
1992), affd, 615 N.Y.S.2d 215 (App. Term 1994) (finding that the plaintiff was not a
permanent resident, as his affidavit stated he was to reside in the shelter "until perma-
nent housing accommodations [were] available").
120 Ann Arbor, 581 N.W.2d at 798-99.
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that no landlord-tenant relationship existed, the state statutes prevent-
ing self-help evictions were inapplicable. 121 Thus, shelters in Michi-
gan may now ensure avoidance of landlord-tenant law by structuring
their agreements around the goal of getting victims out of the shelter.
The court in Ann Arbor further distinguished landlord-tenant
relationships from hotel-guest relationships, noting that a "tenant has
exclusive legal possession and control of the premises against the
owner for the term of his leasehold, whereas a guest is a mere licensee
and only has a right to use of the premises he occupies, subject to the
proprietor's retention of control and right of access."' 22 The court's
analysis of the hotel-guest law therefore indicates that if a shelter
structures its residency agreement such that the relationship is clearly
one of hotel-guest, it may succeed in removing the relationship from
the scope of the landlord-tenant law.
Thus, while some courts interpret their state statutes to declare
that shelters are landlords and shelter residents are tenants, others do
not. The implications of these categorizations are immense for shel-
ters: If landlord-tenant law protects individual residents, shelters are
unable to quickly evict problematic residents who threaten the success
and safety of the shelters. Although the states are split as to the legal
status of shelter residents, public policy considerations overwhelm-
ingly warn against protecting problematic residents at the expense of
the success of shelters.
III. PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS ON LANDLORD-TENANT
RELATIONSHIPS IN THE CONTEXT OF SHELTERS
Public policy is a primary driving force in deciding whether to
recognize a landlord-tenant relationship between shelters and their
residents. On the one hand, applying landlord-tenant statutes to shel-
ters prohibits shelter operators from quickly and decisively evicting
problematic residents. On the other hand, shelter residents must be
protected from arbitrary and unfair eviction, particularly when they
have nowhere else to live.
A. Protecting Troubled Individuals at the Expense of the Shelter
Serreze perfectly illustrates the significant role public policy plays
in judicial determinations of the legal status of shelter residents. 23
121 Id. at 802.
122 Id. at 800.
123 As part of the rationale in Serreze, the court found that the "participants are
capable of independent living, and have been furnished with the means to secure
themselves and their children." Serreze v. YWCA of W. Mass., Inc., 572 N.E.2d 581,
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However, that court's perception of the problem may be misguided.
It reasoned that "[to deny such program participants some form of
predeprivation process may only perpetuate the cycle of temporary
shelter and dislocation." 124 At best, this concern is hypothetical: the
court had no empirical evidence to support its assertion, and the pro-
gram evicted the women as a result of their failure to follow the pre-
scribed program.' 25
The main problem with the reasoning in Serreze is that the court
perceived a wrong committed by the YWCA against the women, and
tried to effectuate a remedy without either a statutory basis or a com-
mon law foundation. The court acknowledged that it sought to pro-
tect the program participants, noting that "in construing the term
'tenant', courts have looked beyond rigid common law definitions to
effectuate an appropriate remedy."' 26 The court's remedy, however,
reinterpreted the language of the anti-self-help statute to include
arrangements that the court acknowledged were not covered by the
traditional relationship. This judicial expansion of the definition of a
tenant probably causes more problems for shelters than it seeks to
solve.
On the other hand, public policy would seem to dictate that
courts try to enforce the antilockout statutes as much as possible. The
purpose of many such statutes is to "reduce the number of violent
confrontations occurring as a consequence of landlords entering onto
the premises while tenants believed that they were rightfully in posses-
584 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991). The independence of these individual plaintiffs implies
that finding a landlord-tenant relationship in these circumstances would not expand
the scope of the statute very far from its original application to the standard relation-
ship. However, this is implausible insofar as the women remain monitored by the
shelter and are still required to attend counseling sessions. The nature of the pro-
grams is such that participation is the only way for the women to transition back to a
normal living arrangement. The court also found that "[u] nder the agreements, [the
victims] reside in an apartment and pay for the exclusive right of possession and con-
trol." Id. at 584. While assertive, this statement does not provide any analysis of the
living arrangements. The court went on to mention the difference between the shel-
ter program in the instant case and those for mental health patients, leaving the ques-
tion unanswered as to what circumstances would not create a landlord-tenant
relationship. Id. at 582-83. The court does not mention why such a distinction is
relevant to the landlord-tenant relationship, as the mental health of the resident is
not a reason to distinguish the relationship.
124 Id. at 584.
125 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 28, at 821 (" [P] lausible arguments were made
that loading up on tenants' rights was not in the best interests of low-income tenants
as a class. This was because the new rights had the potential to cause higher rents and
a reduced supply of housing.").
126 Serreze, 572 N.E.2d at 584 n.9.
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sion."'127 Exempting institutions from these statutes has the effect of
supporting that which the statutes sought to eliminate. Thus,
although courts strive to protect women from their abusers, their
efforts may be counterproductive if they undermine the shelters' abil-
ity to evict problematic residents.
B. Landlord-Tenant Law's Negative Consequences for Shelters
By granting residents rights under state landlord-tenant law,
courts often hurt a shelter's chances of success. 128 The negative con-
sequences range from financially ruining shelters to compromising
their ability to construct the most effective programs. 129 Furthermore,
shelters would have a difficult time evicting violent residents who
threaten other participants and create unhealthy environments.
Finally, allowing someone to stay even when she refuses to adhere to
the program's rules hinders shelters from maintaining discipline and
high expectations.
1. Financial Impact of Court Costs
A significant financial pressure on shelters results from the legal
costs associated with consistently having to institute eviction proceed-
ings.' 30 The Massachusetts Appeals Court in Serreze acknowledged
that a program may be financially hurt by having to go to court in
eviction proceedings, but reasoned that "it is not a characteristic fea-
ture of summary process law that the landlord who seeks possession is
without speedy remedy."13' Even so, an eviction process takes time
and resources that could be better spent helping additional victims. 132
Furthermore, Massachusetts does not require a landlord to present
cause to evict a tenant, mandating only that the landlord use the legal
127 Grant v. Detroit Ass'n of Women's Clubs, 505 N.W.2d 254, 259 (Mich. 1993).
128 See generally Sharon A. Chanley et al., Providing Refuge: The Value of Domestic
Violence Shelter Services, 31 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 393 (2001) (outlining a cost-benefit
analysis to women in shelters and quantifying judicial and legal expenses).
129 See Mullins, supra note 1, at 248-49 ("Shelters are important for battered
women for several reasons. First, they provide women with immediate safety for them-
selves and their children. Second, they often represent the only real means of escape
for battered women. Third, women are able to regain control over their lives with the
support of the shelter's staff and counseling programs." (footnotes omitted)).
130 Serreze, 572 N.E.2d at 584.
131 Id.
132 For a discussion of the demands placed on battered women's shelters for ser-
vices, see Mullins, supra note 1, at 244-45.
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process.1 33 The argument that evictions are not costly therefore does
not respond to the criticism-valuable resources are still being
expended in eviction proceedings.13 4
The Michigan Appeals Court in Ann Arbor recognized the prob-
lem of court costs for shelters and thus based its reasoning partially on
the public policy of supporting shelters. It found that a landlord-ten-
ant relationship "would create an intolerable burden on the YMCA in
its efforts to provide inexpensive temporary lodging for the very peo-
ple it undertakes to serve, with a likely result being that those people
would, in the end, be without accommodations." 135 This recognition
acknowledges the harm that landlord-tenant law inflicts on shelters-
institutions that have the mission of providing services to as many
women as possible. Many of these institutions have extremely limited
financial resources and are unable to offer their services to a large
number of victims when they encounter a litigious resident. 136
Increasing the costs borne by a shelter therefore has the direct impact
of redirecting money from other victims of abuse.
2. Violence in the Shelter
Applying landlord-tenant law to shelters also prevents them from
efficiently evicting violent occupants, which has a significant negative
impact on a shelter. In a traditional landlord-tenant relationship, if a
tenant assaults the landlord, the landlord can bring assault charges
against the tenant and begin eviction proceedings. 137 In such circum-
133 See Serreze, 572 N.E.2d at 584 n.10. The court also noted that some states do
not allow tenants to be evicted without cause. Id. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 239,
§§ 1-1A (2007).
134 The result of higher costs is often a decrease in the scope of services offered.
See Weiner, supra note 2, at 271 ("Funding gaps do not always translate to shelter
closings. Shelters can cut services or lay off staff rather than close.").
135 Ann Arbor Tenants Union v. Ann Arbor YMCA, 581 N.W.2d 794, 802 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1998).
136 See COLEMAN, supra note 31; Mullins, supra note 1, at 249 ("The lack of emer-
gency shelter for battered women is astonishing when compared to the demand for
shelter services. For example, in 1984, 59% of battered women and children seeking
shelter in New York City were turned away due to lack of space." (citing Maria Arias,
Lack of Housingfor Domestic-Violence Victims, N.Y.L.J., July 26, 1988, at 3)); see also id. at
249-50 ("Shelters require funding for rent, upkeep, daily staffing and services. Bat-
tered women's shelters are very dependent upon government money to survive finan-
cially. According to a nationwide survey of battered women shelters, 31% of those
shelters responding to the survey depended entirely upon government funds, while
69% relied upon government money for over one-half of their operating budgets.")
(footnotes omitted).
137 See 49 Am. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 861 (2006).
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stances, however, the violent tenant could be left alone pending the
eviction proceedings, depriving her of the opportunity to harm
others. In the case of shelters, on the contrary, if one of the occu-
pants becomes violent, she is a threat to the other residents and staff,
who cannot avoid her. 138 This has a stifling impact on the ability of
the program to operate while awaiting the removal of the violent ten-
ant. New residents who badly need the shelter's services could also be
turned away pending the eviction of a resident.
The Ann Arbor court noted that "[in] any of the individuals who
occupy the rooms suffer from various mental, emotional, or physical
disorders."13 9 The possibility for harm to others in allowing poten-
tially violent participants to remain on the property is apparent. Shel-
ters would thus have a disincentive to accept someone who may pose a
risk to other participants if the court-imposed costs of eviction are
high. This would also increase the program costs because prospective
residents would need to be properly screened to ensure that they were
stable enough to participate and would not hurt others in the
program.
3. The Impact on Other Residents
Finally, the strict nature of shelter programs and the volatility of
the individuals involved make the facility the most effective authority
to determine when a participant must be evicted. Many of the partici-
pants are victims of domestic violence and some are homeless. Part of
the success of these programs is the shelter's extensive intervention in
a resident's life, which gradually lightens to allow her to become self-
sufficient. 140 If the participants must live in an environment of non-
compliance or violence, they have even greater difficulty rejoining
138 See COLEMAN, supra note 31 ("Shelters have a long-term deterrent effect on
violence when they help women change their lifestyles, keeping them and their chil-
dren safe from future abusive situations.").
139 Ann Arbor, 581 N.W.2d at 796.
140 Women who have been residents at battered women's shelters cited these as
the most effective programs in combating domestic violence. See COLEMAN, supra
note 31 (citing Lee H. Bowker, A Battered Woman's Problems Are Social, Not Psychological,
in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 154, 155-65 (Richard J. Gelles &
Donileen R. Loseke eds., 1993)); see also Weiner, supra note 2, at 190 ("This radical
... change in the social life of the battered wife sets the stage for a major reorienta-
tion of her approach to life. This unique coming together of women in time of adver-
sity, helping each other, can provide a catalyst to recognizing and challenging
oppression, moving women forward in their quest to eliminate it." (citation and inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
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society. 141 This would slow the rehabilitation process, thus preventing
others from joining the program quickly. Given the complexity of
these issues, the shelter is ultimately the most appropriate entity to
monitor residents' progress and enforce its policies.
CONCLUSION
When a victim of domestic violence flees to a shelter, she is seek-
ing refuge from an abuser. Although such women must undoubtedly
be protected, applying the landlord-tenant framework to their stay in
shelters may simply be counterproductive. Most importantly, land-
lord-tenant law would deprive shelters of their ability to easily remove
problematic residents, even when they threaten the staff and other
residents.
In sum, the expansion of protections under state landlord-tenant
laws should not be an impediment to the effective operation of shel-
ters. Such an expansion would only hinder the ability of helpful pro-
grams to function by increasing their costs and burdens. These
organizations' scant resources should instead be spent helping as
many women as possible, not battling litigious residents. Further-
more, shelters should have the autonomy to experiment with pro-
grams that have the most potential to help women effectively without
intervention from the courts. Finally, shelters must be able to main-
tain the highest standards, hopes, and expectations for their residents,
which is only possible with the deterrent effect of swift removal. Thus,
while state statutory law on the issue is unclear, public policy loudly
warns against applying the landlord-tenant framework to shelters.
141 Some shelters allow children of battered women to join them. These impres-
sionable children may be even more harmed in the event a noncompliant victim is
allowed to stay in the shelter. See COLEMAN, supra note 31 ("There is substantial
research evidence that children who witness domestic violence suffer short- and long-
term adverse consequences and may be victims of abuse themselves.").
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